Lockwiki - User contributions [en]

Corbin Emhart

2016-04-30T01:35:40Z

Mcm151201: /* Corbin Emhart */

=Corbin Emhart =

{{Lock model
| name = Corbin Emhart
| Img = File:Corbin_Emhart_cylinder.jpg
| maker = [[Corbin Russwin]]
| lock_type = [[Cylinder]]
| lock_design = [[Pin-tumbler]]
| patent = [http://www.google.com/patents?id=gsg4AAAAEBAJ US 4,098,103]<br>[http://www.google.com/patents?id=Ti8uAAAAEBAJ US 4,103,526]<br>[http://www.google.com/patents?id=E540AAAAEBAJ US 4,208,894]
| years_produced = 1978 - Present
}}

The '''Emhart''' is a [[UL 437]] rated [[pin-tumbler]] lock made by [[Corbin Russwin]]. The Emhart is best known for having interlocking pins that provide resistance to [[lockpicking]] and make the lock immune to [[key bumping]] attacks. The Emhart is one of the few pin-tumbler locks that uses [[axial rotation]] as one of its key control and pick-resistance features.

The Emhart is still produced but only existing systems are supported. Corbin Russwin lost a case filed by [[Medeco]] in 1975 which claimed the Emhart design, particularly the use of axial rotation, infringed upon Medeco's patents. The case was settled in 1977 and forced Corbin Russwin to pay Medeco royalties on each Emhart sold until March of 1987.

The Emhart has since been superceded by the [[Corbin Russwin Pyramid]].

__TOC__

== Principles of operation ==

The Emhart is a [[pin-tumbler]] lock that uses six pin stacks. The driver pins of the Emhart have a T shaped protrusion, with a matching gap on the top of the key pins. These two points interlock, requiring that pins move together until they are disconnected. When pin stacks are properly raised and rotated, movement of the plug causes the pin stacks to disconnect, trapping each driver pin above the [[shear line]]. Driver pins maintain their position by being trapped in grooves around the plug. These grooves double as protection against various forms of [[destructive entry]], as well. The key contains cuts that mirror the grooves in the plug, allowing the plug to rotate completely while keeping the driver pins in the proper position.

The tips of key pins are chiseled at various angles and mate with angled bitting cuts on the key. These cuts provide [[axial rotation]] which is necessary to properly rotate the pin stacks.

The Emhart uses a variable [[MACS]] based on the angle of rotation between pins. Adjacent pins with the same angles use a MACS of 4, adjacent pins with different angles use a MACS of 3.<ref>{{Ref pulford}}</ref>

<div align="center"><gallery>
File:Corbin_Emhart_key.jpg | The Emhart key.
File:Corbin_Emhart_pins.jpg | Interlocking pin stacks.
File:Corbin_Emhart_plug.jpg | Pins properly aligned at the [[shear line]].
File:Corbin_Emhart_plug_pins.jpg | The grooved [[plug]] holds driver pins when rotated.
</gallery></div>

== Dissassembly instructions ==

The Emhart is relatively easy to disassemble, but it cannot be disassembled in as many ways as traditional pin-tumbler locks. Most importantly, the plug cannot be removed with a traditional [[plug follower]] because of the interlocking pins and the ribbed plug. Pin stacks must be installed and removed from the pin chambers only.

# Remove the pin chamber casing and remove the pin stacks.
# Remove the [[cam]] or C-clip.
# Remove the [[plug]].

== Vulnerabilities ==

The Emhart may be vulnerable to one or more of the following:

* [[Lockpicking]]
* [[Impressioning]]
* [[Decoding]]

'''Notes'''
* The Emhart is immune to [[key bumping]] due to the interlocking pins.
* Traditional picking techniques disconnect the pins and leave no easy way to reconnect them (unless the lock is mounted vertically up, see [[Talk:Corbin_Emhart|talk page]]), effectively making the lock non-functional. Overcoming this requires that after the plug is rotated to open the lock the key pins can be raised and rotated back to a position where they can re-engage the driver pins.
* Certain forms of [[destructive entry]], particularly forced removal of the [[plug]], are much harder due to the design of the interlocking pins and the grooved plug.

== Gallery ==

<div align="center"><gallery>
File:Corbin_Emhart_key_angles.jpg
File:Corbin_Emhart_pins_all.jpg
File:Corbin_Emhart_plug_solo.jpg
File:Corbin_Emhart_plug_key.jpg
</gallery></div>

== References ==
<references />

== See also ==

* [[Corbin Russwin]]
* [[Pin-tumbler]]
* [[Axial rotation]]

[[Category:Corbin Russwin| ]]
[[Category:Pin-tumbler locks]]
[[Category:Axial rotation]]

Talk:Master Lock No 1

2010-11-25T22:14:27Z

Mcm151201:

Added "-style" to "key-in-knob-style" in the beginning. The cylinder in the #1 is not a key-in-knob cylinder.
-mcm 11/25/10

Talk:Master Lock No 1

2010-11-25T22:14:19Z

Mcm151201: Created page with 'Added "-style" to "key-in-knob-style" in the beginning. The cylinder in the #1 is not a key-in-knob cylinder.'

Added "-style" to "key-in-knob-style" in the beginning. The cylinder in the #1 is not a key-in-knob cylinder.

Master Lock No 1

2010-11-25T22:13:33Z

Mcm151201: /* Master Lock No. 1 */

= Master Lock No. 1 =

{{Lock model
| name = Master Lock No. 1
| Img = File:Mastercommercial.JPG
| Img_size = 150px
| maker = [[Master Lock]]
| lock_type = [[Padlock]], [[Cylinder]]
| lock_design = [[Pin-tumbler]]
| years_produced =
| patent =
| related =
}}

The '''No. 1''' is a [[pin-tumbler]] [[padlock]] made by [[Master Lock]]. The No. 1 uses a laminated padlock body with an internal key-in-knob-style [[cylinder]]. The inner cylinder uses four pin stacks and does not use any [[security pin]]s.

The No. 1 is one of the most common low security padlocks used in the United States.

__TOC__

== Principles of operation ==

The No. 1 cylinder is a [[pin-tumbler]] lock with four pin stacks and no [[security pin]]s. The cylinder typically uses the [[M1]] [[Key#Types_of_Keys|key profile]] but may use other profiles, as well. The standard No. 1 can be opened in both directions but the "commercial" series body restricts opening to clockwise rotation. The No. 1 is not a [[key retaining]] padlock.

== Disassembly instructions ==

The No. 1 cannot be disassembled non-destructively. To disassemble it the rivets that hold the laminated body together must be removed and each layer removed individually. The inner cylinder itself can be disassembled in the same manner as a traditional pin-tumbler lock:

{{Pin-tumbler standard disassembly}}

'''Notes'''
* The No. 1 cylinder requires a small diameter plug follower.

== Vulnerabilities ==

The No. 1 is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. The reduced pin tumbler count and poor manufacturing tolerances makes it an easy lock to pick. It's commonly given to [[locksport]] beginners as a "confidence lock"; a lock that is easy to open and inspires you to continue picking. The No. 1 may be vulnerable to one or more of the following:

* [[Lockpicking]]
* [[Key bumping]]
* [[Impressioning]]
* [[Decoding]]
* [[Bypass]]
* [[Destructive entry]]

== Gallery ==

<div align="center"><gallery>
File:Master_Lock_commercial_no1_padlock.jpg
File:cutawaym1.JPG|A cutaway No. 1 padlock and cylinder.
</gallery></div>

== See also ==

* [[Padlock]]
* [[Pin-tumbler]]
* [[Master Lock]]

[[Category:Padlocks]]
[[Category:Master Lock|No 1]]
[[Category:Pin-tumbler locks]]

Talk:Schlage SecureKey

2010-11-25T22:12:44Z

Mcm151201:

What would be a better description than wafer lock? The "wafers" don't technically align at the shear line.
-mcm

11/18/10 - Added redirect from "securekey" (mcm)

----

I dunno...those are wafers. I consider it a wafer sidebar lock; nothing else really fits and those are close enough to wafers in the automobile sense that I see no problem with calling them that.

[[User:Datagram|Datagram]] 21:59, 18 November 2010 (UTC)
----
Locksmiths don't refer to them as wafers, and the manufacturer doesn't refer to them as wafers. I feel describing them as such is factually incorrect. They share no common attributes with wafers... except that they are lifted vertically. I think we should stick with the terminology the manufacturer has used for these locks. Even by the definition of wafers at (http://www.lockwiki.com/index.php/Wafer) they are not wafers, not to mention the formal definition of a wafer: "a flat tumbler which must be drawn into the cylinder plug by the proper key so that none of its extremities extends into the shell 2. a flat, usually rectangular tumbler with a gate which must be aligned with a sidebar by the proper key." This tumbler has two distinct parts, and is not flat.
-mcm 11/25/10

Schlage SecureKey

2010-11-18T20:48:22Z

Mcm151201: /* Rekeying instructions */

=Schlage SecureKey=

{{Lock model
|name = Schlage SecureKey
|Img = File:Schlage SecureKey cylinder.jpg
|maker=[[Schlage]]
|lock_type=[[Cylinder]]
|lock_design=[[Wafer]],[[Hybrid lock|Hybrid]]
|years_produced = 2010 - Present
|patent=[http://www.google.com/patents?id=wbixAAAAEBAJ US 12/138,950]
}}

The '''SecureKey''' is a user-rekeyable [[wafer]] lock made by [[Schlage]]. It uses five wafers that interact with a [[sidebar]] to provide protection against [[lockpicking]] and [[key bumping]]. The SecureKey is similar in design, functionality, and name to the [[Kwikset SmartKey]]. The rekeying mechanisms of both locks have considerable differences, however.

The SecureKey can be identified by the traditional Schlage C keyway warding and the + above the keyway.

__TOC__
<br clear=all>
== Principles of operation ==

Schlage SecureKey locks feature 5 tumblers which need to be aligned properly to allow for the retraction of a single sidebar. Each tumbler consists of two parts: a "tongue pin" which rides on the key and a "slider" which has a cut away gate to allow for sidebar entry. The side of the slider opposite the gate features 10 narrow slits, one for each possible key depth, in which a corresponding male protrusion of the tongue pin remains. The tongue pins reside in a separate housing which is tilted away (clockwise) from the sliders during the reset procedure. When this occurs the male protrusion leaves the slider, allowing a new key to be inserted. Turning the plug back to the neutral position re-mates the two halves, leaving it to accept the new key.

The blue reset key features a protrusion on the right side of the key. This protrusion depresses a spring-loaded blocking mechanism in the plug which in effect unlocks the housing containing the tongue pins. Only then can the tongue pin housing tilt away, separating the two halves. When separated the keyway is narrowed partially by the front most part of the tongue pin housing. This forces the use of the specially made blue reset keys, which are thinner to accommodate this.

<div align="center"><gallery>
File:Schlage_SecureKey_keys.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_wafers.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_wafer_pin.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_sidebar_aligned.jpg
</gallery></div>

== Rekeying instructions ==

In order to rekey the Secure Key you need to have a reset key for the current bitting and the desired bitting.

# Insert the reset key for the current bitting.
# Rotate the plug to the 11 o'clock position. The [[plug]] should click into place as the guide pin housing disengages the wafers.
# Remove the reset key and insert the reset key for the desired bitting.
# Rotate the plug back to the 12 o'clock position and remove the reset key.
# Test the new working key.

'''Notes'''
* Do not return the plug to the default position without a reset key inserted.
* Do not attempt to reset the key bitting with a blank reset key. Some wafers may not engage the guide pins and the lock will be non-functional.
* If any errors occur you can always completely disassemble and resassemble the lock to return it to a working condition.
* If sufficient variation between adjacent cuts is not present, non-reset keys may be able to be pulled out of the lock at the 11 o'clock and 4 o'clock positions.

== Disassembly instructions ==

# Remove the [[cam]] or C-clip.
# Remove the [[plug]] from the [[cylinder]]. You may have to raise the wafers so they do not block removal of the plug.
# From here the guide pin housing and guide pins can be removed, then the wafers and the guide pin housing spring.

'''Notes'''
* Using a working key to position wafers and guide pins is recommended when re-assembling the lock.
* The guide pin housing is difficult to re-assemble if you do not have prior experience with the lock.

== Vulnerabilities ==

The SecureKey may be vulnerable to one or more of the following:

* [[Lockpicking]]
* [[Impressioning]]
* [[Decoding]]
* [[Destructive entry]]

'''Notes'''
* The SecureKey cannot be bumped because it does not use pin-tumbler components.
* Various decoding and destructive attacks against the [[Kwikset SmartKey]] also work against the SecureKey.

== Gallery ==

<div align="center"><gallery>
File:Schlage_SecureKey_cylinder2.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_key_plug.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_plug.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_plug2.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_profiles.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_reset_position.jpg|Plug rotated to the reset position.
File:Schlage_SecureKey_bottom.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_keyway.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_sidepin_normal.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_sidepin_moved.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_sidebar.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_pin_housing_bottom.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_pin_housing.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_pin_forensics.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_pin.jpg
</gallery></div>

== References ==
<references />

== See also ==

* [[Wafer]]
* [[Schlage]]
* [[Sidebar]]
* [[Kwikset SmartKey]]

[[Category:Schlage|SecureKey]]
[[Category:Wafer locks]]
[[Category:Sidebar locks]]

Schlage SecureKey

2010-11-18T20:46:27Z

Mcm151201: /* Principles of operation */

=Schlage SecureKey=

{{Lock model
|name = Schlage SecureKey
|Img = File:Schlage SecureKey cylinder.jpg
|maker=[[Schlage]]
|lock_type=[[Cylinder]]
|lock_design=[[Wafer]],[[Hybrid lock|Hybrid]]
|years_produced = 2010 - Present
|patent=[http://www.google.com/patents?id=wbixAAAAEBAJ US 12/138,950]
}}

The '''SecureKey''' is a user-rekeyable [[wafer]] lock made by [[Schlage]]. It uses five wafers that interact with a [[sidebar]] to provide protection against [[lockpicking]] and [[key bumping]]. The SecureKey is similar in design, functionality, and name to the [[Kwikset SmartKey]]. The rekeying mechanisms of both locks have considerable differences, however.

The SecureKey can be identified by the traditional Schlage C keyway warding and the + above the keyway.

__TOC__
<br clear=all>
== Principles of operation ==

Schlage SecureKey locks feature 5 tumblers which need to be aligned properly to allow for the retraction of a single sidebar. Each tumbler consists of two parts: a "tongue pin" which rides on the key and a "slider" which has a cut away gate to allow for sidebar entry. The side of the slider opposite the gate features 10 narrow slits, one for each possible key depth, in which a corresponding male protrusion of the tongue pin remains. The tongue pins reside in a separate housing which is tilted away (clockwise) from the sliders during the reset procedure. When this occurs the male protrusion leaves the slider, allowing a new key to be inserted. Turning the plug back to the neutral position re-mates the two halves, leaving it to accept the new key.

The blue reset key features a protrusion on the right side of the key. This protrusion depresses a spring-loaded blocking mechanism in the plug which in effect unlocks the housing containing the tongue pins. Only then can the tongue pin housing tilt away, separating the two halves. When separated the keyway is narrowed partially by the front most part of the tongue pin housing. This forces the use of the specially made blue reset keys, which are thinner to accommodate this.

<div align="center"><gallery>
File:Schlage_SecureKey_keys.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_wafers.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_wafer_pin.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_sidebar_aligned.jpg
</gallery></div>

== Rekeying instructions ==

In order to rekey the Secure Key you need to have a reset key for the current bitting and the desired bitting.

# Insert the reset key for the current bitting.
# Rotate the plug 10 ° to the left (counter clockwise). The [[plug]] should click into place as the guide pin housing disengages the wafers.
# Remove the reset key and insert the reset key for the desired bitting.
# Rotate the plug back to the default position and remove the reset key.
# Test the new working key.

'''Notes'''
* Do not return the plug to the default position without a reset key inserted.
* Do not attempt to reset the key bitting with a blank reset key. Some wafers may not engage the guide pins and the lock will be non-functional.
* If any errors occur you can always completely disassemble and resassemble the lock to return it to a working condition.

== Disassembly instructions ==

# Remove the [[cam]] or C-clip.
# Remove the [[plug]] from the [[cylinder]]. You may have to raise the wafers so they do not block removal of the plug.
# From here the guide pin housing and guide pins can be removed, then the wafers and the guide pin housing spring.

'''Notes'''
* Using a working key to position wafers and guide pins is recommended when re-assembling the lock.
* The guide pin housing is difficult to re-assemble if you do not have prior experience with the lock.

== Vulnerabilities ==

The SecureKey may be vulnerable to one or more of the following:

* [[Lockpicking]]
* [[Impressioning]]
* [[Decoding]]
* [[Destructive entry]]

'''Notes'''
* The SecureKey cannot be bumped because it does not use pin-tumbler components.
* Various decoding and destructive attacks against the [[Kwikset SmartKey]] also work against the SecureKey.

== Gallery ==

<div align="center"><gallery>
File:Schlage_SecureKey_cylinder2.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_key_plug.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_plug.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_plug2.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_profiles.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_reset_position.jpg|Plug rotated to the reset position.
File:Schlage_SecureKey_bottom.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_keyway.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_sidepin_normal.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_sidepin_moved.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_sidebar.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_pin_housing_bottom.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_pin_housing.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_pin_forensics.jpg
File:Schlage_SecureKey_pin.jpg
</gallery></div>

== References ==
<references />

== See also ==

* [[Wafer]]
* [[Schlage]]
* [[Sidebar]]
* [[Kwikset SmartKey]]

[[Category:Schlage|SecureKey]]
[[Category:Wafer locks]]
[[Category:Sidebar locks]]

Talk:Schlage SecureKey

2010-11-18T20:34:57Z

Mcm151201:

What would be a better description than wafer lock? The "wafers" don't technically align at the shear line.
-mcm

11/18/10 - Added redirect from "securekey" (mcm)

Talk:Kwikset Smart Key

2010-11-18T20:33:40Z

Mcm151201: Created page with '11/18 - Added redirect from "smartkey" (mcm)'

11/18 - Added redirect from "smartkey" (mcm)

Smartkey

2010-11-18T20:33:15Z

Mcm151201: Redirected page to Kwikset Smart Key

#REDIRECT [[Kwikset Smart Key]]

Talk:Bypass

2009-01-14T23:25:15Z

Mcm151201:

Mcm,
<br>
I'd like to remove 'intended authentication, usually a key or combination' because this is irrelevant in context (lockpicking too does not need either). Bypass is unique because it is an attack against non-cylinder portions of the lock, namely actuator or bolt (While it is right to include latch I don't think it is necessary; makes it a bit wordy). We also have "a bypass occurs" a few too many times, and the ending is a bit wordy if we include surreptitious (eventually I'd like to have the NDE page like to covert/s.e anyways...). Here's my proposed change:<br>

"A bypass occurs when a [[Lock|lock]] is compromised without affecting the integrity of the lock cylinder. Generally, the [[Bolt|bolt]] or [[Actuator|actuator]] are targetted, though in some methods a knob or handle on the rear of a door is manipulated to allow entry. Bypass takes many forms, and can be either [[Non-destructive_Entry|non-destructive]] or [[Destructive_Entry|destructive]] depending on the techniques used."

<br>-dg, 01.12.09<hr>

Well in my opinion the term "bypass" can loosely be defined as any method to unlock a lock, I suppose even including the key. I would consider lockpicking a form of bypass, for example. When I am unlocking someone's house for them, and I pick the lock, I am bypassing that lock.
<hr><br>
Mcm,<br>
The technical definition, one that I'd like to follow at lockwiki to avoid confusion is that any method to unlock a lock is known as a "compromise." Attacks against the cylinder are lockpicking. Attacks against non-cylinder lock components or surrounding area are bypass, named so because you are bypassing the security offered by the cylinder itself. Decoding is an attack against internal components, but does not necessarily open the lock or produce a key, only tell you the proper alignment of components. Impressioning is essentially a combination of decoding and lockpicking with the distinction of producing a working key. Some techniques are a gray area (e.g. tryout keys), but are still technically attacks against the cylinder and are thus classified as lockpicking. Most of these classifications aren't applied to destructive techniques (drilling isn't "lockpicking," of course), but some are blanket terms that involve destructive methods. For the sake of simplicity and clarity we can ignore these cases.
<br>-dg, 01.13.09<hr>

My understanding of the term bypass, as accepted by the Lock Industry Standards and Training and the Associated Locksmiths of America, is that a bypass is any method which unlocks a lock.

"by-pass tool
n. a device that neutralizes the security of a locking device, or its application hardware, often taking advantage of a design weakness"

This can include picking. Is there perhaps another standard for which I am not aware?
<hr>
Mcm,<br>
Your definition is correct, but your are mis-interpreting it. The key word is "neutralize," which means that the security of the cylinder is null and void. During lockpicking, the cylinder's security is your obstacle. In bypass it is not, because you are neutralizing/bypassing it altogether. If you reference the methods section, you'll see the definition matches up quite nicely in terms of noting that it is usually a design flaw of the lock (actuator) or application hardware (bolt/latch) that are targetting in bypass.
<br>-dg, 01.13.09<hr>

I read it as a bypass "neutralizes the security of a locking device," meaning the device no longer provides the security which is intended. The device being the lock on the door, or padlock, etc.
<hr>
Mcm,<br>
Again, that is correct, but you are not understanding the difference. For some supporting info, search LP101 for "bypass." Almost all threads you'll see involve non-lockpicking/impressioning/decoding methods. In fact, full discussion of bypasses are limited to the advanced section only, because of the difference. You can also look at lockpicks.com and lockpickshop.com for bypass tools (they have their own section). You'll see that they are mostly actuator/bolt attacking tools, including some destructive tools.
<br>-dg, 01.14.09
<hr>
<br>
I understand the difference that you are saying, I guess I just disagree with it. I think most trading locksmiths in the industry would agree with me in that lockpicking is a type of bypass. I would consider all of the following bypasses:<br>
Hand picking<br>
Use of a comb pick<br>
Foil Impressioning<br>
Bumping<br>
Using a pick gun<br>
Shim decoding<br>
Impressioning<br>
Masterkey system reverse engineering<br>
Sigh reading wafers/pin colors<br>
Tryout Keys<br>
<br>
As well as...<br>
Padlock Shimming<br>
Loiding<br>
Actuator/Bolt manipulators<br>
Bouncing<br>
Twisting<br>
Drilling<br>
Cutting<br>
Spreading<br>
Burning<br>
Pulling<br>
<br>
As these are all methods which compromise the security of a locking device. Perhaps for the sake of this page we can include a not that says bypasses excluding those which manipulate the cylinder itself?<br>

Talk:Bypass

2009-01-14T23:24:33Z

Mcm151201:

Mcm,
<br>
I'd like to remove 'intended authentication, usually a key or combination' because this is irrelevant in context (lockpicking too does not need either). Bypass is unique because it is an attack against non-cylinder portions of the lock, namely actuator or bolt (While it is right to include latch I don't think it is necessary; makes it a bit wordy). We also have "a bypass occurs" a few too many times, and the ending is a bit wordy if we include surreptitious (eventually I'd like to have the NDE page like to covert/s.e anyways...). Here's my proposed change:<br>

"A bypass occurs when a [[Lock|lock]] is compromised without affecting the integrity of the lock cylinder. Generally, the [[Bolt|bolt]] or [[Actuator|actuator]] are targetted, though in some methods a knob or handle on the rear of a door is manipulated to allow entry. Bypass takes many forms, and can be either [[Non-destructive_Entry|non-destructive]] or [[Destructive_Entry|destructive]] depending on the techniques used."

<br>-dg, 01.12.09<hr>

Well in my opinion the term "bypass" can loosely be defined as any method to unlock a lock, I suppose even including the key. I would consider lockpicking a form of bypass, for example. When I am unlocking someone's house for them, and I pick the lock, I am bypassing that lock.
<hr><br>
Mcm,<br>
The technical definition, one that I'd like to follow at lockwiki to avoid confusion is that any method to unlock a lock is known as a "compromise." Attacks against the cylinder are lockpicking. Attacks against non-cylinder lock components or surrounding area are bypass, named so because you are bypassing the security offered by the cylinder itself. Decoding is an attack against internal components, but does not necessarily open the lock or produce a key, only tell you the proper alignment of components. Impressioning is essentially a combination of decoding and lockpicking with the distinction of producing a working key. Some techniques are a gray area (e.g. tryout keys), but are still technically attacks against the cylinder and are thus classified as lockpicking. Most of these classifications aren't applied to destructive techniques (drilling isn't "lockpicking," of course), but some are blanket terms that involve destructive methods. For the sake of simplicity and clarity we can ignore these cases.
<br>-dg, 01.13.09<hr>

My understanding of the term bypass, as accepted by the Lock Industry Standards and Training and the Associated Locksmiths of America, is that a bypass is any method which unlocks a lock.

"by-pass tool
n. a device that neutralizes the security of a locking device, or its application hardware, often taking advantage of a design weakness"

This can include picking. Is there perhaps another standard for which I am not aware?
<hr>
Mcm,<br>
Your definition is correct, but your are mis-interpreting it. The key word is "neutralize," which means that the security of the cylinder is null and void. During lockpicking, the cylinder's security is your obstacle. In bypass it is not, because you are neutralizing/bypassing it altogether. If you reference the methods section, you'll see the definition matches up quite nicely in terms of noting that it is usually a design flaw of the lock (actuator) or application hardware (bolt/latch) that are targetting in bypass.
<br>-dg, 01.13.09<hr>

I read it as a bypass "neutralizes the security of a locking device," meaning the device no longer provides the security which is intended. The device being the lock on the door, or padlock, etc.
<hr>
Mcm,<br>
Again, that is correct, but you are not understanding the difference. For some supporting info, search LP101 for "bypass." Almost all threads you'll see involve non-lockpicking/impressioning/decoding methods. In fact, full discussion of bypasses are limited to the advanced section only, because of the difference. You can also look at lockpicks.com and lockpickshop.com for bypass tools (they have their own section). You'll see that they are mostly actuator/bolt attacking tools, including some destructive tools.
<br>-dg, 01.14.09
<hr>

I understand the difference that you are saying, I guess I just disagree with it. I think most trading locksmiths in the industry would agree with me in that lockpicking is a type of bypass. I would consider all of the following bypasses:
Hand picking
Use of a comb pick
Foil Impressioning
Bumping
Using a pick gun
Shim decoding
Impressioning
Masterkey system reverse engineering
Sigh reading wafers/pin colors
Tryout Keys

As well as...
Padlock Shimming
Loiding
Actuator/Bolt manipulators
Bouncing
Twisting
Drilling
Cutting
Spreading
Burning
Pulling

As these are all methods which compromise the security of a locking device. Perhaps for the sake of this page we can include a not that says bypasses excluding those which manipulate the cylinder itself?

Talk:Bypass

2009-01-14T06:31:38Z

Mcm151201:

Lock manufacturer

2009-01-14T06:28:11Z

Mcm151201: /* Black & Decker */

=Lock Manufacturers=

==ASSA ABLOY==
* ABLOY
* Arrow
* ASSA
* Chubb
* Corbin
* Corbin Russwin
* Corni
* Emtek
* Fab
* Fichet
* Guli
* Zeiss Ikon
* Interlock
* Keso
* La Fonte
* Lips
* Litto
* Lockwood
* Medeco
* Mul-T-Lock
* NEMEF
* Phillips
* Poli
* Ruko
* Sargent
* TESA
* TrioVing
* Union
* Vachette
* Wangli
* Yale

==Black & Decker==
* Baldwin
* Kwikset
* Weiser

==Diebold==
* Diebold
* Mosler
* Herring-Hall-Marvin

==Fortune Brands==
* Master Lock
* American Lock

==Ingersoll Rand==
* Bricard
* Briton
* Cisa
* Dexter
* Falcon
* ITO Kilit
* Kryptonite
* Legge
* Martin Roberts
* Monarch
* Schlage

==Kaba Group==
* Mas Hamilton
* Kaba Mas
* La Gard
* Ilco

==Other==
* Abus
* Anker
* Bramah
* Brinks
* EVVA
* MIWA
* Potent
* Saife
* Winkhaus

==Premiere Lock Company==
* Weslock

==Stanley==
* Best
* National
* Sargent & Greenleaf

Lock manufacturer

2009-01-14T06:27:18Z

Mcm151201: /* Lock Manufacturers */

=Lock Manufacturers=

==ASSA ABLOY==
* ABLOY
* Arrow
* ASSA
* Chubb
* Corbin
* Corbin Russwin
* Corni
* Emtek
* Fab
* Fichet
* Guli
* Zeiss Ikon
* Interlock
* Keso
* La Fonte
* Lips
* Litto
* Lockwood
* Medeco
* Mul-T-Lock
* NEMEF
* Phillips
* Poli
* Ruko
* Sargent
* TESA
* TrioVing
* Union
* Vachette
* Wangli
* Yale

==Black & Decker==
* Kwikset
* Baldwin
* Weiser

==Diebold==
* Diebold
* Mosler
* Herring-Hall-Marvin

==Fortune Brands==
* Master Lock
* American Lock

==Ingersoll Rand==
* Bricard
* Briton
* Cisa
* Dexter
* Falcon
* ITO Kilit
* Kryptonite
* Legge
* Martin Roberts
* Monarch
* Schlage

==Kaba Group==
* Mas Hamilton
* Kaba Mas
* La Gard
* Ilco

==Other==
* Abus
* Anker
* Bramah
* Brinks
* EVVA
* MIWA
* Potent
* Saife
* Winkhaus

==Premiere Lock Company==
* Weslock

==Stanley==
* Best
* National
* Sargent & Greenleaf

Lock manufacturer

2009-01-14T06:26:58Z

Mcm151201: /* Lock Manufacturers */

=Lock Manufacturers=

==ASSA ABLOY=
* ABLOY
* Arrow
* ASSA
* Chubb
* Corbin
* Corbin Russwin
* Corni
* Emtek
* Fab
* Fichet
* Guli
* Zeiss Ikon
* Interlock
* Keso
* La Fonte
* Lips
* Litto
* Lockwood
* Medeco
* Mul-T-Lock
* NEMEF
* Phillips
* Poli
* Ruko
* Sargent
* TESA
* TrioVing
* Union
* Vachette
* Wangli
* Yale

==Black & Decker==
* Kwikset
* Baldwin
* Weiser

==Diebold==
* Diebold
* Mosler
* Herring-Hall-Marvin

==Fortune Brands==
* Master Lock
* American Lock

==Ingersoll Rand==
* Bricard
* Briton
* Cisa
* Dexter
* Falcon
* ITO Kilit
* Kryptonite
* Legge
* Martin Roberts
* Monarch
* Schlage

==Kaba Group==
* Mas Hamilton
* Kaba Mas
* La Gard
* Ilco

==Other==
* Abus
* Anker
* Bramah
* Brinks
* EVVA
* MIWA
* Potent
* Saife
* Winkhaus

==Premiere Lock Company==
* Weslock

==Stanley==
* Best
* National
* Sargent & Greenleaf

Talk:Bypass

2009-01-14T02:27:54Z

Mcm151201:

Talk:Bypass

2009-01-13T22:36:41Z

Mcm151201:

Impressioning

2009-01-13T05:27:06Z

Mcm151201: /* Impressioning */

=Impressioning=

Impressioning is a [[Non-destructive_Entry|non-destructive]], [[Covert_Entry|covert]] method of creating a working key for a lock without picking or disassembly.

The process for impressioning wafer locks an pin tumbler locks is a pretty simple concept. Firs, the proper key blank for the lock is identified. This key blank is then put all the way into the lock, bound by applying turning pressure, and then moved. The movement causes the tumblers (which are being bound) to leave small marks on the key blank. These marks are then interpreted and filed. This process is repeated until a working key is made.

==Blank Selection==
Key blank selection is of vital importance to the whole impressioning process. Typical problems include selecting a blank which is too long, which can be detected by close inspection of the shoulder of the key blank. It should come in complete contact with the face of the plug (and sometimes recessed a little further into the plug). Another common problem is selecting a key blank which is too short, and does not pick up all the pins or wafers. A good example is selecting a SC1 blank versus an SC4 blank. SC1 and SC4 refer to a common industry reference, not manufacturer blank numbers. SC1 is a [[Schlage|Schlage]] "C" keyway, five pin, and SC4 is the same keyway but for six pin. A six pin blank will rarely work in a five pin lock, the rare exception being if the tip of the blank happens to raise the sixth pin to the correct height.

==Blank Preparation==
For pin tumbler locks, the blank is usually prepared by using a fine file to clean the top edge of the blank to leave it with a uniform texture. This is also sometimes the case with wafer locks as well, but another method which many employ with great success on wafer locks is to file the side of the blank to leave it with a blade-like edge. Personal preference plays a great deal into blank preparation.

Sometimes other parts of the key blank are modified as well in preparation for impressioning. For example, M1 blanks for standard [[Master_Lock|Master Locks]] sometimes have a shoulder which is too tall for impressioning due to the 'slop' in the lock. Without removing some of the top of the shoulder, it will 'bottom out' on the face of the lock before it actually allows the pins to bind.

==Obtaining Marks==
After the blank is selected and prepped, it is typically inserted into some kind of vice. Many companies offer locksmiths vices specifically for impressioning, but others rely simply on a pair of four inch vice grips. The key is then inserted into the lock. There are several different ways to obtain marks:

;Pull-out method
:The blank is inserted, and then turning pressure is applied. By withdrawing the key while applying pressure, sometimes small lines can be seen. Some specialty tools are made specifically for this, which have a trigger to pull the key out slightly.

;Rocking method
:The blank is inserted, and then turning pressure is applied. The key is the rocked up, against the pins, to obtain marks. Sometimes the key is tipped before applying turning pressure to isolate marks. For example, if the key is tipped with the tip upward, and then rocked so the head goes up, the marks closer to the head will be easier to identify. The opposite is also true, where the tip starts down and is rocked up. In that case, the tip will show more marks if there are any.

;Bumping method
:The blank is inserted, and turning pressure is applied. A strike is then applied to the head of the key from a small mallet for example. This strike against the binding pins leaves marks.

==Interpreting Marks==
After obtaining marks, the key is taken out of the lock for inspection. Sometimes aids are used, such as magnifying glasses or even different color lights. In pin tumbler locks, pins leave small circular marks. They will be a uniform distance from the edge of the blade (although not always centered), and from each other. In contrast, wafer locks tend to leave more rectangular marks, and they are very often found on the edge of the blade. It is for this reason that sometimes blanks are "knife edged" in preparation for impressioning, because wafer locks will 'crush' the knife edge away and leave very obvious marks.

==Filing Marks==
When a mark is identified, the next step is to file that cut. Some chose to use a code machine to cut the key down to the next possible known depth in that space, but others (or those lacking the equipment, will use a fine file. Very little is taken off at one time, depending on the particular lock. For example, Schlage locks (and many other locks) use ten different depths, so not much will be taken off. In contrast, some wafer locks (such as many of those in cars) have only four or five depths, in which case a little more may be taken away. Special care is given to the width and slope of cuts, as to not interfere with nearby marks and also allow for easy insertion and withdrawal of the key. If the slopes on a cut are too steep, the key may not enter or may get stuck in the lock.

==Final Steps==
When a pin reaches the correct height, it will no longer bind against the plug when turned, and will therefore no longer leave marks in that spot. Once all the pins are at the correct height, the plug will turn.

At this point, the key can be cleaned up by more carefully sloping edges, and taking off any sharp points. Sometimes a micrometer will be taken to the key and cuts will be rounded to the nearest known factory cut to produce a key by code.

Keys which have been used in impressioning are typically not used long, because they become exceptionally weak from being bound in the cylinder repeatedly.

[[Category:Lockpicking]][[Category:Covert Entry]]

Lockpicking

2009-01-13T04:42:00Z

Mcm151201: /* Legality */

=Lockpicking=

Lockpicking is the art of opening a [[Lock|lock]] through the analysis and manipulation of its components without using a [[Key|key]] intended to open the lock. The process is generally [[Non-Destructive Entry|non-destructive]] and [[Covert Entry|covert]], and is contrasted with various forms of [[Destructive Entry|destructive entry]]. When dealing with the opening of [[Safe|safes]] or vaults, it is referred to as [[Safecracking|safecracking]]. A [[Bypass|bypass]] is technically different than picking the lock, though there are many similarities between the two techniques.

Lockpicking is made possible by small irregularities during the manufacturing of locks. Small variations in the size, shape, and alignment of components allows for picking tools to be used to pick the lock. Depending on the type of lock, different methods of picking may be available.

==History==

Add to me!

==Picking Methods==

There are various methods used to successfully pick a lock. There is no "right" way to pick; every lockpicker has their own preference. The most common types of picking are listed:

;Single Component Picking
:A pick designed to manipulate individual components is used. Single pin picking focuses on the irregularities of each individual component to determine the order of [[Binding|binding]] and proper position of each component. Commonly referred to as single "pin" picking, but applicable to non-pin locks, too. Though many pick types are suitable, the classic hook shaped pick is most appropriate.

;[[Raking]]
:A pick designed to manipulate many (or all) components is used. Raking focuses on rapidly varying the position of components in the lock to simulate a wide variety of key depths. Raking is especially effective if the proper position of components is in a predictable pattern, such as a staircase. Picks specifically designed for raking are known as rakes.

;[[Pick_Gun|Pick Guns]]
:A pick gun is designed to hit the bottom of all pins and transfer energy to the pin stacks to allow for rapid opening of the lock mechanism. Vibration picks fall into this same category.

;[[Bumping|Bump Keys]]
:A key with depth cuts to the lowest positions. Key bumping is a fundamental problem in most pin tumbler locks that allows for energy transfer between the bump key and the pin stacks to allow for rapid opening of the lock mechanism. This is similar in function to the use of a pick gun.

;[[Tryout_Keys|Tryout Keys]]
:A set of keys modified to different depth positions. Tryout keys take advantage of poor tolerances in locking components. While most locks represent themselves as having a large amount of theoretical [[Differs|key differs]], some have very few due to poor tolerances.

;[[Comb_Pick|Comb Picks]]
:A pin-tumbler pick designed to move all pin stacks out of their blocking position by pushing them into the cylinder chambers, allowing the plug to rotate freely.

;[[Impressioning]]
:The process of duplicating or otherwise simulating the action of a proper key for the target lock. Impression can take many forms, some of which are not strictly classified as lockpicking.

;[[Decoding]]
:The process of decoding the position of internal components either through manipulation of components, disassembly of the lock, or analysis of the key. Decoding can take many forms, most of which are not strictly classified as lockpicking.

==Tools Used==

The specific tools used to open the look depend on the [[Types_of_Locks|type of lock]] and the preferences of the lockpicker.

Traditional picking of most locks involves both a [[Picks|pick]] and [[Tension|tension tool]]. The pick is used to manipulate internal components to their unlocked position and the tension tool is used to hold the components at these positions and retract the locking bolt once hte lock is picked. When all components are in the unlocked position the lock is free to open and considered picked. This applies to pin-tumbler, tubular/axial, dimple, and lever locks.

[[Warded]] locks are distinct because they do not require the use of a tension tool to be picked. Instead, only picks are used.

[[Combination]] locks generally do not require tools unless they are a hybrid locking design. Most combination locks are opened with decoding or bypass rather than picking.

==Legality==

The practice of lockpicking in itself is generally entirely legal. Most legal complications with lockpicking as a hobby stem from possession of lockpicking tools. See the [[Legal_Issues|Legal Issues]] page for more information.

==Lockpicking in the Media==

Lockpicking has been portrayed in many television shows and films. Often techniques and tools are incorrect, with the most common mistake being the lack of a tension tool. In most cases the lock is picked almost instantly, which misrepresents the difficulty and skill involved in picking the majority of locks.

Television:
* 24
* Dexter
* Desperate Housewives
* Heroes
* House
* Lost
* MacGuyver
* Monk
* Mythbusters [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kU25tflOK1E 1]
* N.C.I.S.
* Supernatural
* The X-Files

Films:
* Das Leben Der Anderen [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1kYNK5PjoZ0 1]
* Foolproof
* Gone in 60 Seconds
* Midnight Run
* Mission Impossible 3
* Predator 2
* Real Genius
* See No Evil
* Silence of the Lambs
* US Marshalls
* Terminator 2
* The Italian Job
* The Skulls

==See also==
* [[Lock]]
* [[Key]]
* [[Locksport]]
* [[Impressioning]]
* [[Decoding]]

[[Category:Covert Entry]][[Category:Lockpicking]]

Category:Surreptitious Entry

2009-01-13T04:39:47Z

Mcm151201: /* Surreptitious Entry */

=Surreptitious Entry=

Surreptitious entry is a method of entry that leaves absolutely no evidence, forensic or otherwise.

Examples of surreptitious entry include using the correct key, extrapolating the top master key, and using a discreet video camera to record a combination to a safe

==See also==
* [[Covert_Entry|Covert Entry]]
* [[Destructive_Entry|Destructive Entry]]

Bypass

2009-01-13T04:33:43Z

Mcm151201: /* Bypass */

=Bypass=

A bypass occurs when a [[Lock|lock]] is compromised without the intended authentication, usually a [[Key|key]] or [[Combination|combination]]. Often, a bypass occurs when the lock's [[Latch|latch]] or [[Bolt|bolt]] are retracted without the turning of the cylinder, for example by [[Loiding|loiding]]. Bypass takes many forms, and can be either [[Non-destructive_Entry|non-destructive]] or [[Destructive_Entry|destructive]], with non-destructive methods being [[Covert_Entry|covert]] or sometimes [[Surreptitious_Entry|surreptitious]].

==Methods of Bypass==

There are few generic methods of bypass for lock cylinders; techniques are specific to design or installation flaws present in certain locks.

;Padlock Shimming
:Padlock shimming is perhaps the most ubiquitous method of bypass. It involves taking a small piece of metal and separating the locking bolt from the shackle in a padlock. Many low to medium security padlocks are vulnerable to this technique. Shims are available commercially, but can be made quickly with aluminum cans or, surprisingly, sufficiently strong paper.

;Lock Actuator Attacks
:Flaws in the design and placement of the locking actuator for the cylinder may allow a bypass tool to retract the locking bolt without the proper key inserted, or even internal components being in the proper positions. Various lock manufacturers have suffered from this vulnerability in the past.

;Locking Bolt Attacks
:Flaws in the design or installation of the locking bolt may allow the bolt to be retracted without using the correct key or picking the lock cylinder. The classic credit-card opening of doors and slim jim on cars are two popular examples.

[[Category:Covert Entry]]